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Modern life-cycle theory is based upon the premise that consumers
think seriously and coherently about the relatively distant and uncertain
future. While the empirical validity of this premise is controversial,
existing evidence is either highly indirect or anecdotal. To resolve this
controversy, it is necessary to conduct direct comparisons of con-
sumers' plans and expectations with eventual realizations.
Previous empirical work on household expectations has focused pri-
marily on short-run inflation (see Huizinga 1980, Curtin 1982, Gramlich
1983, and Papadia 1982; Aiginger 1979 considers a somewhat broader
range of variables). Accordingly, these studies shed very little light on
the issue of whether consumers form accurate expectations and suc-
cessful economic plans over relatively long time horizons.
In a separate paper (Bernheim 1988), I have studied the accuracy of
pre-retirement expectations concerning Social Security benefits. I found
that while survey responses to questions about expected benefits con-
tain a relatively high level of noise, there is nevertheless strong evi-
dence that consumers do think seriously about future events. While
consumers do not form expectations on the basis of all available in-
formation, they do appear to be reasonably competent at making rel-
atively accurate forecasts conditional upon the information that they
do use. Indeed, the data broadly suggest that consumers correctly
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anticipated the general effects of legislative action during the early
1970s, contrary to the supposition of most previous authors (see, e.g.,
Hurd and Boskin 1981; Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn 1986; and
Burtless 1986).
In the current paper, I employ data drawn from the Social Security
Administration's Retirement History Survey (RHS) to study the ac-
curacy of expectations concerning the timing of retirement. This is an
important complement to my earlier work, in that Social Security ben-
efits are largely determined by exogenous events, while retirement is
a fundamental decision variable. Accordingly, the emphasis here is on
the accuracy of economic plans, rather than pure expectations. While
many authors have previously studied determinants of the retirement
decision (see the surveys by Hurd 1983, and Mitchell and Fields 1982),
all have simply assumed that workers make systematic and viable re-
tirement plans. There is no previous test of this proposition.
The major findings of this study are as follows.
1. Survey responses to questions about expected dates of retirement
reflect modes, rather than means. That is, consumers report the most
likely date of retirement, rather than the mean date, given subjective
probabilities. This distinction is extremely important, since the distri-
bution of actual retirement dates for a fixed expectation is highly skewed.
Unlike the case of Social Security benefits, the evidence does not
support the view that consumers report noisy measures of expectations.
2. Most individuals are reasonably competent at forming relatively
accurate expectations about the timing of retirement. Alternatively,
consumers apparently form serious economic plans and ordinarily stick
to them. Perhaps surprisingly, there is once again very little evidence
to support the view that expectations were abnormally inaccurate dur-
ing periods in which Social Security benefits enjoyed significant stat-
utory increases.
3. The accuracy of expectations differs systematically by population
subgroup. In contrast to my findings for Social Security benefits, I find
that men form more accurate retirement expectations than women,
although single women do appear to gain relative accuracy as retirement
approaches. Married women are particularly prone to discover that
they must work longer than expected. Comparatively wealthy individ-
uals tend to make somewhat more accurate forecasts, but education
does not improve predictive skill. Some evidence also suggests that
workers with mandatory retirement dates typically retire much sooner
than expected, perhaps because they suppose erroneously that alter-
native employment will be easy to find.
Work by Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn (1986) has also employed
the RHS data on retirement expectations. Their object was to use this337 The Timing of Retirement
data in an analysis of behavior rather than to identify properties of
reported expectations, as in the current paper. My findings are at odds
with the implicit assumptions upon which these authors based their
behavioral analysis, and therefore they call their results into question.
Hall and Johnson (1980) have also studied retirement expectations, but
their object was to model the formation of plans rather than to compare
these plans with later realizations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 11.2 discusses some al-
ternative hypotheses about the nature of reported expectations con-
cerning the timing of retirement. I describe the data in section 11.3.
Section 11.4 tests the view that individuals report mean realizations
given probabilistic beliefs. In section 11.5, I consider the hypothesis
that respondents report modal beliefs, i.e., most likely dates of retire-
ment. Finding the evidence favorable, I proceed to a comparison of
various population subgroups in different survey years.
11.2 The Alternative Hypotheses
When an individual is asked to report his expected date of retirement,
what does his answer represent? Survey questions about expectations
are unfortunately ambiguous and admit several possible interpreta-
tions. Yet if we are to make valid use of these data in any behavioral
context, it is essential to resolve this issue.
One possibility is that the typical individual reports the mean of some
subjective probability distribution. It is useful to set up this hypothesis
formally. Let R be the individual's actual date of retirement. At some
time t, he has access to information, I(t), which he uses to form sub-
jective beliefs about the timing of retirement. Let p[r\I(t)] denote the
subjective probability that the individual will retire at date r, given
available information at time t, and let ER{i) denote his reported ex-
pectation at time t. The first hypothesis is that
(1) ER(t) = E[R I /(*)],
where £[.] indicates a mathematical expectation based on the proba-
bility distribution /?[.].
Unless we place some additional restriction on the subjective prob-
ability distribution, this proposition is not testable. My strategy is to
test it jointly with the hypothesis of rational expectations. Specifically,
if one assumes that the subjective probability distribution /?[.] coincides
with the objective distribution, then equation (1) suggests a regression
of R on an intercept, ER(t), and I(t). Under the joint hypotheses, the
intercept and coefficients of I{t) should be 0, while the coefficient of
ER(t) should be 1. It is, of course, essential that one only include338 B. Douglas Bernheim
informational variables that the individual actually used in forming his
expectations. Since this is difficult to establish a priori, it is advisable
to conduct a weak form of this test by omitting the I(t) entirely.
My study of expected Social Security benefits provided strong sup-
port for the analog of this first hypothesis, and one might therefore
expect to find the data supportive here as well. Yet it is essential to
understand that retirement is a very different kind of event than the
realization of Social Security benefits. Many workers form extremely
specific retirement plans, which they intend to follow barring unfore-
seen circumstances. In contrast, workers may have only "ballpark"
notions about their Social Security benefits. Accordingly, it is easily
conceivable that, when asked about their expectations, individuals re-
port means for Social Security benefits but report the most likely out-
come for date of retirement.
This discussion leads naturally to the second hypothesis, which is
that measured expected dates of retirement reflect modes of subjective
distributions. Formally,
(2) ER(t) = argmaxr p[r I /(/)].
Once again, this proposition is not testable in the absence of further
restrictions on the subjective distribution. As before, my strategy is to
test it jointly with the hypothesis of rational expectations. Assuming
thatp[.] coincides with the true objective distribution, one can compare
measured expectations with modal realizations.
While these two hypotheses certainly do not exhaust all conceivable
alternatives (e.g., perhaps individuals report medians, or pure noise),
1
I take them to be the most interesting possibilities.
11.3 Data
The data for this study are drawn from the Social Security Admin-
istration's Retirement History Survey (RHS), which followed a sample
of retirement-aged households (58 to 63 years old in 1969) for a period
of 10 years, beginning in 1969. Each household was surveyed once
every two years (1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, and 1979). Although the initial
wave included more than 11,000 households, there was substantial
attrition over successive waves.
Each working respondent reported his or her expected age of re-
tirement in every survey year, with the exception of married women,
who were not asked this question in 1973. Using the respondent's age,
I transformed this variable into ERET, the expected date of retirement.
Survey responses to questions about expected retirement were ex-
tremely sparse in 1977 and 1979 (primarily because most of the sample339 The Timing of Retirement
had already retired by 1977); I therefore focus on expectations reported
in the first four survey waves.
The primary advantage of the RHS is that it allows the analyst to
identify realizations by employing data from subsequent survey waves.
While the identification of a date of retirement is usually problematic,
here it poses few difficulties. In the current context, it is not necessary
or even desirable to obtain a conceptually "correct" measure of re-
tirement. When an individual reports an expected date of retirement,
he may well have in mind some idiosyncratic notion of what retirement
means. However, unless he changes his notion over time, one can
assume that self-reported retirement refers to the same potentially idio-
syncratic event. Accordingly, I use self-reported retirement to con-
struct RET, my measure of the eventual realization.
Unfortunately, data on self-reported retirement are somewhat in-
complete. Although individuals do report whether or not they consider
themselves retired in each survey year, they are not asked to indicate
exactly when retirement took place. This creates a problem in that
surveys were administered in alternate years. In practice, I calculate
RET as follows. First, I identify the first survey year in which the
respondent reported himself to be retired. Second, for this same survey
year, I determine the date at which the respondent left his last job. If
this falls within the previous two years, I take it to be his date of
retirement. If it does not (typically because of missing information), I
determine the date at which the respondent began to receive Social
Security benefits. If this falls within the previous two years, I take it
to be his date of retirement. If it does not, I simply assume that he
retired midway between the surveys.
In conjunction with testing the first set of joint hypotheses, I relate
forecast errors to available information in order to identify the kinds
of information that individuals either ignore or process incorrectly. I
consider a large number of informational variables, which I group into
three categories.
The first category contains variables which measure other reported
expectations. The inclusion of these variables allows me to determine
whether or not individuals have internally consistent expectations, in
the sense that they base all expectations on the same set of information.
Definitions of specific variables follow:
ESS: expected Social Security benefits
EOI: expected retirement income, other than Social Security
Data on expectations are, of course, incomplete—many individuals
who report an expected date of retirement do not, for example, report
expected Social Security benefits. Accordingly, I also use dummy340 B. Douglas Bernheim
variables, which equal 1 if the individual reports the associated ex-
pectation, and 0 otherwise. I refer to the dummies corresponding to
the two variables listed above as DSS and DOI.
The second category includes a single variable, which is the indi-
vidual's current Social Security entitlement, CSS, defined as the level
of benefits he would receive under current law if he retired immediately.
CSS is, theoretically, part of each individual's information set, in that
it depends only upon his own past earnings history and upon current
law (which is public information). My previous study of Social Security
benefits suggested that individuals fail to use much of the information
contained in CSS; since it is natural to suppose that workers adjust
retirement plans upon learning more about Social Security entitle-
ments, this information could be correlated with the forecast error for
date of retirement as well.
The third and final category includes various demographic variables
and other household characteristics which might be useful in predicting
retirement. The list of variables includes:
MAR: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the re-
spondent is married (1 = married, 0 = other)
DIV: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the re-
spondent is divorced (1 = divorced, 0 = other)
WID: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the re-
spondent is a widow or widower (1 = widow or wid-
ower, 0 = other)
AGE: the respondent's age
SAGE: the respondent's spouse's age
ED: the respondent's level of educational attainment (mea-
sured in number of years)
SED: the respondent's spouse's level of educational
attainment
W: the household's net wealth (including financial assets,
businesses, and real property)
GH: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the re-
spondent reports his health as being better than av-
erage for his age (1 = better, 0 = other)
BH: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the re-
spondent reports his health as being worse than av-
erage for his age (1 = worse, 0 = other)
KIDS: number of children
COMPRET: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the re-
spondent's employer maintains a compulsory retire-
ment age (1 = yes, 0 = no)
MOVE: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the re-
spondent has moved within the past two years.341 The Timing of Retirement
Before passing on to analysis of the data, it is important to discuss
two potential problems. The first concerns sample selection biases. I
drop observations from the analysis for three reasons: 1) the respondent
fails to report an expected date of retirement, 2) the reported date is
obviously nonsensical (e.g., it precedes the date at which it was re-
ported), or 3) the household disappeared from the RHS prior to re-
tirement. Note that the first two items both reflect household
characteristics that are known when the respondent makes his forecast.
Since the forecasts are then presumably conditioned on this informa-
tion, no sample selection biases arise. The third item (subsequent at-
trition) is potentially problematic. I return to this issue in section 11.4,
where I propose and implement a statistical correction.
The second problem concerns the non-independence of realizations.
In a short panel such as the RHS, forecast errors are probably cor-
related across observations due to "macro" events. Since the 1970s
witnessed several large and potentially unexpected real increases in
Social Security benefits, this problem is potentially severe. In partic-
ular, real Social Security benefits increased by 4.2 percent in January
1970, 4.8 percent in January 1971, and 14.1 percent in September 1972.
In addition, benefits were "double indexed" for inflation from 1975 to
1977. If, as suggested by many analysts, unanticipated increases in
Social Security benefits caused many workers to retire unexpectedly
early, then we might well find that expectations were systematically
off during this period. On the other hand, the major benefit increases
were primarily concentrated in a few years (especially 1972). It should
be possible to shed some light on the question of whether these changes
were indeed unanticipated by looking for evidence of systematic fore-
cast errors at those points in time.
11.4 The Mean Value Hypothesis
I begin formal analysis of the data by comparing expectations to
mean realization in order to test the first hypothesis discussed in section
11.2. Table 11.1 contains some highly revealing summary statistics for
married men. For each survey year, I have grouped observations by
common values of ERET. For each group, I report four things: the
difference between the average date of actual retirement and ERET,
the standard deviation of the retirement date, the mean squared forecast
error, and the number of observations.
The most striking feature of table 11.1 is that there is very little
relationship between ERET and the average date of retirement. To be
sure, those with higher values of ERET tend to retire later, on average.
However, the mean date of retirement coincides with ERET in few if






































































































that the mean date equals ERET with at least 95 percent confidence.
2
Roughly speaking, it appears that a one-year change in the expected
date is associated with slightly less than a one-half year change in the
average realized date. The implications of equation (1) are strongly
contradicted.
Other aspects of table 11.1 are also puzzling. The standard deviation
of RET does not appear to be higher for groups that intend to retire in
the more distant future, despite the fact that information should im-
prove as retirement grows more imminent. Similarly, mean squared
forecast errors do not rise monotonically with ERET. Yet standard
errors and mean squared forecast errors both fall monotonically be-343 The Timing of Retirement
tween successive survey years. The mean value hypothesis provides
no clue as to the source of this trend.
As remarked in section 11.3, these calculations suffer from potential
sample selection biases. Specifically, I have dropped from my sample
all individuals who leave the survey before retiring. Unless attrition is
associated with earlier-than-normal retirement, the (objective) ex-
pected date of retirement for such individuals, conditional upon ERET
and observed behavior, exceeds the expectation based upon ERET
alone. Accordingly, the omission of these observations probably biases
the estimated mean retirement date downward.
To correct for this problem, one must know something about the
retirement behavior of individuals after they leave the sample. By def-
inition, this is unobservable. Consequently, it is necessary to maintain
an ancillary hypothesis. In order to make some illustrative calculations,
I assume that attrition is not systematically related to subsequent re-
tirement.
3 This assumption allows me to correct for sample selection
as follows. For each subsample (characterized by survey year and
ERET), I calculate hazard rates for retirement in each year, i.e., the
number of individuals retiring in that year divided by the total number
of individuals remaining from the original subsample (including those
who subsequently left the sample before retiring). Under my maintained
hypothesis, this yields a consistent estimate of the true population
hazard rate. From these rates, one can then reconstruct the true dis-
tribution of retirement dates.
In practice, relatively few individuals who met my other selection
criteria actually left the sample before retiring. As a result, the impact
of this correction was extremely small. For most cells, the mean of the
corrected distribution exceeded the uncorrected mean by 0.1 year; in
a few cases the difference was 0.2 years, and in a few others it was
virtually zero. The corrected distributions strongly resembled the un-
corrected distributions, and indeed the modes did not differ in any cell.
Thus, I conclude that the sample selection bias is of little consequence.
Furthermore, I suspect that the correction used here overstates the
bias, in that attrition is probably correlated with earlier-than-normal
retirement.
In light of the results in table 11.1, it should hardly be surprising that
a regression of RET on ERET produces extremely negative results.
Coefficient estimates appear in equation 1 of table 11.2. These results
are based on expectations reported in 1971 but are representative of
other years as well. I have chosen to report results for 1971 only because
the data for that year are somewhat superior (in 1969, the ESS variable,
used below, is flawed; in 1973, ERET is not available for married women;
in 1975, the total data sample is much smaller). Note that the intercept












































far below unity and is estimated very precisely. Formally, this signals
a resounding rejection of the null hypothesis.
Yet one should not be too hasty in discarding the mean value hy-
pothesis. I obtained similar negative findings in my analysis of expec-
tations concerning Social Security benefits, but noted that these could
be attributable to "noisy" measurement of the expectations variable.
Formal analysis bore this conjecture out. It is therefore advisable to
investigate the same possibility in the current context.
The classical remedy for measurement error is instrumental vari-
ables. In the current context, a variable is a valid instrument if it belongs
to the information set on which the individual based his expectation.
Unfortunately, the identity of this set is known only to the individual.
Accordingly, one must maintain the hypothesis that individuals do use
certain kinds of information in order to conduct the test.
The evidence in my previous study supported the view that individ-
uals use the same information to form all of their expectations. This
suggests that other expectations (ESS, EOI) are valid instruments. Of
course, these variables may also be measured with error, but this is of
no consequence as long as the measurement errors are uncorrelated.
Equation 2 in table 11.2 provides estimated coefficients, where the
expectational variables have been used as instruments. While the es-
timates are somewhat less precise than those obtained through OLS,
the overall picture is unchanged.
For completeness, I have included two additional regressions, using
the other two sets of informational variables as instruments. One can
think of these regressions as reflecting alternative hypotheses about
the kinds of information that workers actually use when constructing
their forecasts. The results are uniformly negative. I obtain the most
favorable estimates by using CSS as an instrument (equation 3). How-
ever, my previous study clearly established that individuals do not make
use of all the information contained in CSS; it is therefore an unsuitable
instrument.345 The Timing of Retirement
These results contrast with my findings for expectations about Social
Security benefits. The statistical failure of the mean value hypothesis
cannot in this case be traced to the presence of measurement error.
Upon reflection, this is hardly surprising. Since individuals probably
do not have very precise notions about their future Social Security
benefits, it stands to reason that they will report "ballpark" figures.
However, it seems likely that most workers form very specific plans
about the timing of retirement, particularly as it becomes more im-
minent. It is difficult to understand why an individual would report that
he intends to retire at age 63, if in fact he plans to do so at age 65.
It is, of course, possible that the negative results in table 11.2 all
stem from a failure to identify appropriate instruments. I therefore
present one final set of estimates in table 11.3. Here, I have regressed
the forecast error (RET — ERET) on the full complement of informa-
tional variables. This procedure yields consistent estimates even if
ERET is measured with error (unfortunately, it precludes us from test-
ing the theory by examining the coefficient of ERET). If the mean value
hypothesis is correct, then one can determine the kinds of information
that individuals either ignore or use improperly by examining the coef-
ficient estimates. Note first that the coefficients of the expectational
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the use of these variables as instruments, and strengthens the conclu-
sion that my negative results are not attributable to measurement error.
Variables appearing with statistically significant coefficients include
AGE, GH, and COMPRET. The last of these is particularly interesting,
since it suggests that workers at jobs with mandatory retirement ages
tend to believe that they will be able to continue working longer than
they actually can. However, I caution that this conclusion is based
upon a suspect empirical specification, in that my findings are generally
unfavorable to the mean value hypothesis.
11.5 The Modal Value Hypothesis
I now turn to the possibility that respondents report their most likely
dates of retirement, rather than mean dates. To investigate this hy-
pothesis, I group observations by common values of ERET for each
survey year and compute the modal realization for each group. Table
11.4 presents results for married men. This table contains 20 cells,
identified by the survey year and value of ERET. In each cell, I report
(in order) the modal value of RET minus ERET, the fraction of the
group for which RET and ERET coincide, the fraction of the group
for which RET is within one year of ERET, and the total number of
observations.
The most striking aspect of table 11.4 is that the modal realization
coincides with ERET in 16 out of 20 cells. In the four remaining cases,
the mode differs from ERET by only a single year, and ERET is the
second most common outcome, lagging the mode by a relatively small
margin. Since ERET exceeds the mode in exactly half (two) of these
cases, there is no indication of systematic bias.
One can also obtain some feeling for the accuracy of reported ex-
pectations by examining the second and third entries in each cell. I
caution against placing too much emphasis on the fraction of respon-
dents for whom RET and ERET coincide exactly. An individual who
is 62 years old in 1969 and who reports that he intends to retire when
65 could plan to leave his job in either 1971, 1972, or 1973, depending
upon his exact date of birth. Since it is impossible to identify the month
during which an individual retires, I cannot adjust for this ambiguity.
Accordingly, it is more appropriate to examine the fraction of individ-
uals for which RET differs from ERET by at most one year. Note that
as long as individuals do not intend to retire too far in the future,
expectations are highly accurate; in all 16 cells for which ERET exceeds
the survey year by four years or less, more than 60 percent of the
respondents retired within one year of ERET.
As an individual approaches retirement, he presumably forms his












































































































therefore expect the accuracy of his forecast to improve. It is possible
to examine this prediction in two different ways. First, one can inves-
tigate the relationship between ERET and accuracy during any survey
year by reading down columns. While accuracy does not decline mono-
tonically with the expected date of retirement, there is a general ten-
dency for it to fall. Second, one can examine the relationship between
accuracy and the survey date for any given value of ERET by reading
across rows. Note that in 23 of 24 possible pairwise comparisons (12
for fractions with RET = ERET, 12 for fractions with RET within one
year of ERET), accuracy improves when the question is posed at a
later date. In the one remaining case, it is simply unchanged. This348 B. Douglas Bernheim
finding provides striking confirmation for the view that information
improves as individuals approach retirement.
An additional feature of table 11.4 merits comment. Let T denote
the survey year. Fix t, and consider individuals who expect to retire
in year T + t. There is a strong tendency for the accuracy of expec-
tations to rise with T(to see this, read table 11.4 diagonally). The reason
for this phenomenon is not immediately obvious. At first, one might
suppose that, given t (expected length of time until the event of in-
terest), the date of reporting should not affect accuracy. However, one
must bear in mind that average age is greater in later survey years.
This causes significant compression of the retirement distribution, which
leads in turn to greater accuracy. This observation underscores an
important point: one should not assume that the shape of the condi-
tional distribution is invariant with respect to either ERET or age. I
will return to this point shortly.
Table 11.4 also sheds some light on the question of whether unan-
ticipated changes in Social Security benefits during the early 1970s
caused many workers to retire earlier than expected. Recall that by far
the largest real benefit increase took place in 1972. If this change in-
duced substantial early retirement, we would expect to see abnormal
deviations from retirement plans during this period. There is little evi-
dence of this in table 11.4. A substantial number of respondents in both
1969 and 1971 reported that they expected to retire after 1972. In 6 of
the 8 relevant cells, the modal expectation still coincides with ERET.
For those reporting ERET = 1975 in 1969, the modal realization was
actually after 1975, not before. Only for those reporting ERET = 1973
in 1969 was the modal realization less than ERET, and indeed in this
case 1972 was the most frequent date of retirement. Note, however,
that 1969 forecasts for those with ERET = 1973 are only slightly less
accurate than 1971 forecasts for those with ERET = 1975 (also 4 years
in the future). Note also that 1971 forecasts for those with ERET =
1973 are actually more accurate than either 1973 forecasts for those
with ERET = 1975, or 1969 forecasts for those with ERET = 1971
(both also 2 years in the future). Together, these observations suggest
that changes in benefit levels did not induce substantial early retirement
for individuals who had expected to stop working in 1973.
The substantial divergence of means and modes (tables 11.1 and 11.4)
suggests that the conditional distributions of retirement dates may be
highly skewed. This supposition is in fact correct. Figures 11.1 and
11.2 illustrate the distribution of retirement dates by ERET for 1969.
One can see that when ERET is low, the conditional distribution is
skewed to the right; as ERET rises, the skew shifts to the left. If
reported expectations represent modes rather than means, this pattern
is natural. Those expecting to retire very soon will, if surprised, gen-349 The Timing of Retirement
erally retire later, and those expecting to retire late will, if surprised,
generally retire sooner. This explains why the mean moves so much
less than the mode, as noted in tables 11.1 and 11.4.
Failure to recognize this pattern can easily lead to misinterpretation
of the data. Consider for example the study by Anderson, Burkhauser,
and Quinn (1986). These authors examined the relationship between
unexpected deviations from retirement plans and unexpected changes
in Social Security benefits. They calculated the latter variable by com-
paring actual benefits available in the year of expected retirement to
the level of benefits that would have been available had the 1969 statutes
been adjusted for cost of living only. Through multinomial logit anal-
ysis, they found that respondents who experienced larger unexpected
increases in Social Security benefits were much more prone to retire
earlier than planned. Yet it now seems likely that this finding is merely
an artifact of the data. Note that the authors' measure of unexpected
benefit increases is primarily determined by ERET; the later the re-
spondent expects to retire, the more the 1969 legislation will understate
benefits available in the year of expected retirement. Furthermore, the
pattern of skewness implies that higher values of ERET are associated
with a greater frequency of unexpected early retirement. Combining
these two observations leads one to expect a strong positive association
between unexpected benefits and early retirement, even in the absence
of a behavioral response. It is therefore conceivable that the finding is
entirely spurious.
In fact, figures 11.1 and 11.2 provide only a very slight indication
that the 1972 benefit changes may have induced some early retirement.
In particular, the distributions for ERET = 1969, 1973, and 1975 exhibit
somewhat higher frequencies for 1972 than one might ordinarily expect.
However, the pattern is certainly far from overwhelming.
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Fig. 11.2 Distribution of RET by ERET, 1969, part 2
As a final step, I provide a comparison of expectations and reali-
zations for various population subgroups, including married men, mar-
ried women, single men, single women, widowers, widows, married
men with high wealth, married men with low wealth, married men with
high levels of educational attainment, and married men with low levels
of educational attainment. I present results in tables 11.5 through 11.8,
which correspond to each of four different survey years (1969 through
1975). Several consistent patterns emerge. First, married women form
the least accurate expectations and are most likely to work longer than
planned. Lower accuracy results in part from the fact that women tend
to be younger and therefore further from retirement than their hus-
bands. However, even if one compensates for this by, for example,
comparing married men in 1969 to married women in 1975, the pattern
is still evident. Second, there is a general tendency for single individ-
uals, widows, and widowers to retire earlier than expected more fre-
quently than married individuals. Third, in early survey waves the
expectations of single women and widows were much less accurate
than those of married men. However, in later waves this gap narrowed,
and indeed the expectations of single women became more accurate
than those of married men. Fourth, education appears to be inversely
related to accuracy. Wealth is positively related to accuracy in early
survey waves, but negatively related in later waves.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section is strongly consistent
with the joint hypotheses that 1) when asked to report an expected
date of retirement, an individual will describe the outcome that he or
she considers most likely, and 2) the subjective distribution of retire-
ment dates coincides with the objective distribution. Since this distri-
bution is highly skewed, and since the skewness is related to the expected
date of retirement, one cannot interpret the data as reflecting mean
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view that unanticipated benefit increases led many workers to retire
unexpectedly during the early 1970s.
Notes
1. It is worth noting that the data do not appear to be consistent with the
hypothesis that individuals report the medians of objective distributions. In
fact, the pattern of medians is quite similar to the pattern of means.
2. It is possible to obtain the standard deviation of the mean retirement date
in each cell from the standard deviation of the retirement date and the number
of observations.
3. This assumption may seem peculiar when attrition is due to death. If,
however, one believes (as seems natural) that individuals report expected dates
of retirement conditional upon surviving until retirement, then the assumption
is appropriate, since one wishes to know what each individual would have
done had he survived.
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Comment Edward P. Lazear
I am a fan of Bernheim's work, and this paper has done nothing to
change my view. It is a careful analysis of the relation of expected
retirement age to actual retirement age. The main question that I want
to raise is, "Why is this interesting?" Or, put otherwise, "What else
would we like to know?" Bernheim motivates the analysis by stating
that life-cycle theory is based on the premise that consumers think
seriously and coherently about the distant future. But for most of life-
cycle theory, what is relevant is opportunities rather than outcomes.
Retirement is an outcome, a point chosen on an opportunity locus, and
it is not clear what it means or why it is relevant. Bernheim did some
work on Social Security that spoke directly to this issue.
To make the point, consider the work-leisure diagram in figure 11.3.
Point A is the expected outcome, and points B and C are actual
outcomes under two different scenarios. Both B and C correspond to
lower retirement ages than A since more years of retirement leisure
are taken. The retirement age could be lower than the expected re-
tirement age for one of two reasons. First, as illustrated by point B,
opportunities get worse and wage offers fall. The substitution effect
induces the worker to take more leisure, but he is worse off than he
was at A. Second, income from nonlabor sources may rise, as illus-
trated by point C. The income effect induces the worker to take more
leisure, and he is better off than he was at A. Bernheim looks at Social
Security payments, so he goes part of the way there. But pension buy-
outs are important, as Laurence Kotlikoff and David Wise have found
in their data (ch. 10, in this volume). Additionally, spousal income may
be a factor. Although both cases show up as an actual retirement date
that is earlier than the expected one, and although both have impli-
cations for life-cycle models, the implications are very different. In one
case, early retirement implies an unanticipated fall in standard of living.
In the other, it implies a rise.
The following extensions are the most important:
First, forecasts of variables that are the determinants, rather than
the outcome, of retirement are more interesting. Data are lacking,
except perhaps for health status.
Second, it would be useful to find out what happens to those who
fail to predict their ages of retirement correctly. Specifically, what hap-
pens to income, assets, housing, and food consumption? Hausman and
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Fig. 11.3 Work-leisure diagram
Paquette (1987) find that food consumption falls for those who suffer
early retirement.
Third, the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated and be-
tween voluntary and compulsory retirement is significant. Voluntary
might be defined as an improvement in one's leisure or alternative work
opportunities. Compulsory might be defined as the current job situation
getting worse. Is the group of those who retire earlier than anticipated
dominated by compulsory or voluntary retirements? The answer has
important implications for welfare.
Fourth, and related, married women forecast badly. They seem to
work longer than expected. Are they widows who forecast their hus-
band's life expectancy badly, or are they pleasantly surprised by the
wonderful job offer that McDonald's made them to make french fries?
Fifth, and a more general way to put the point: When workers are
wrong, does it matter? Is the change in rent associated with the un-
anticipated event large or small? For example, it could be that expected
retirement deviates by a large amount from actual retirement because
wages are close to alternatives so that a small change in either induces
a large change in retirement ages. Under these circumstances, little
consumer surplus is lost even when there are big differences between
expected and actual retirement.
Sixth, are bad forecasters bad because they experience more un-
anticipated events than others or are they poorer at data processing?
It is one thing to say that women forecast badly because they are faced
with more uncertainty. It is another to say that they are worse at making
decisions, given the same amount of uncertainty.
Here are some other minor points:
1. The analysis does not exploit the panel fully. Although it does
look at whether predictions get better as the individual nears the358 B. Douglas Bernheim
retirement age, it is useful to know how the expected age of retirement
changes as one ages. Do all 55 year olds think that they will work to
70 and subsequently revise their forecasts downward, or do they think
that they will work to 57 and revise it upward? More generally, what
determines how ERET changes over time?
2. Are good Social Security forecasters also good retirement fore-
casters? This bears on the issue of whether bad forecasters are bad
because of their data-processing abilities or because they face more
uncertainty. If there is no consistency between ability to forecast Social
Security and retirement, then perhaps difference in forecast ability
reflects differences in the variance in opportunities, rather than in data
processing.
This was a good paper. I learned something from it, and the results
are credible. At worst, it does not go far enough.
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